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Multi-Agent Distributed Optimization
Roel Dobbe*, Ye Pu, Jingge Zhu, Kannan Ramchandran, Claire Tomlin
Abstract—Real-time data-driven optimization and control
problems over networks may require sensitive information of
participating users to calculate solutions and decision variables,
such as in traffic or energy systems. Adversaries with access
to coordination signals may potentially decode information on
individual users and put user privacy at risk. We develop local
differential privacy, which is a strong notion that guarantees user
privacy regardless of any auxiliary information an adversary may
have, for a larger family of convex distributed optimization prob-
lems. The mechanism allows agent to customize their own privacy
level based on local needs and parameter sensitivities. We propose
a general sampling based approach for determining sensitivity
and derive analytical bounds for specific quadratic problems. We
analyze inherent trade-offs between privacy and suboptimality
and propose allocation schemes to divide the maximum allowable
noise, a privacy budget, among all participating agents. Our
algorithm is implemented to enable privacy in distributed optimal
power flow for electric grids.
I. INTRODUCTION
Advances in sensing and computing enable various in-
frastructures, such as traffic or energy networks, to perform
optimization and control problems in real-time throughout a
network. Often the scale of such problems desires a distributed
implementation that can be solved quickly enough to allow
for high frequency control actions. To enable this, a network
may be split up into sub-networks governed by different
agents, who exchange their local optimization variables with
neighbors and/or a central operator to iteratively solve the opti-
mization problem. Exchanging optimization variables between
agents and the changes therein may reveal private information,
such as whether someone is home and what kind of appliances
someone is using [11]. In addition, there is growing under-
standing that secondary information may be inferred from the
communicated variables, including the parameters used in the
local objective and constraints, which may reveal sensitive
information such as prices and capacity [10].
To make matters more challenging, different agents may be
competing with each another to serve an operator with their
service. Knowing the control capacity of and prices negotiated
by other players can help in negotiating with the operator
and leads to strategic behavior and untruthful communica-
tion, which harms the quality of solution to the distributed
optimization problem. As such, both personal privacy and
commercial privacy needs require the development of agent-
to-agent distributed optimization algorithms that can mask
sensitive information in objectives and constraints.
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In recent years, various privacy-preserving algorithms have
been proposed for distributed optimization and control prob-
lems, using various privacy metrics. The differential privacy
framework [8] has gained most attention, and is particularly
lauded for its robustness to auxiliary side information that an
adversary might have to complement information gained from
a particular algorithm, providing stronger privacy guarantees
than other existing metrics. The framework assumes a setting
in which sensitive information is stored in a database by a
trustworthy curator, which can provide answers to external
queries. A system is made differentially private by random-
izing its answers in such a way that the distribution over
published outputs is not too sensitive to changes in the stored
data. Perturbation can be designed to make it provably difficult
for an adversary to make inferences about individual records
from the published outputs.
In the setting of distributed optimization, each agent is its
own curator managing its own locally private information and
communication of its optimization variables to neighboring
agents or a central operator. In order to preserve differential
privacy, each curator has to ensure that the output of queries,
that is the communicated variables, remain approximately
unchanged if local parameters relating to its objective or
constraints are modified.
Related Work
This work complements an existing and rapidly growing
body of literature on incorporating differential privacy into
resource allocation and, most relevant here, in distributed
optimization, control and networked systems. Earlier work
by Hsu et al. [12] developed differential privacy-preserving
algorithms for convex optimization problems that are solved
in a central fashion, considering general linear programs
(LPs) with either private objectives or constraint. Dong et
al. [6] consider privacy in a game theoretic environment,
motivated by traffic routing in which the origins and des-
tinations of drivers are considered private. Jia et al. [14]
consider occupancy-based HVAC control a thend treat the
control objective and the location traces of individual oc-
cupants as private variables, using an information-theoretic
privacy metric. A recent elaborate tutorial paper by Corte´s et
al. [5] covers differential privacy for distributed optimization,
and distinguishes between objective-perturbing and message-
perturbing strategies for distributed optimization. In the first
category, each agents objective function is perturbed with noise
in a differentially private manner, which guarantees differential
privacy at the functional level and is preferred for systems with
2asymptotically stable dynamics [18]. In the second category,
coordination messages are perturbed with noise before sent,
either to neighbors or a central node, depending on the specific
algorithm. Huang et al. [13] proposed a technique for dis-
guising private information in the local objective function for
distributed optimization problems with strongly convex separa-
ble objective functions and convex constraints. Han et al. [10]
considered problems where the private information is encoded
in the individual constraints, the objective functions need to
be convex and Lipschitz continuously differentiable, and the
constraints have to be convex and separable. Other related
works are Mo and Murray [17] who aim to preserve privacy
of agents’ initial states in average consensus and Katewa et
al. [15] who explore an alternative trade-off between privacy
and the value of cooperation (rather than performance) in
distributed optimization. In [23], a privacy-aware optimization
algorithm is analyzed using the cryptography notion of zero
knowledge proofs. More recently, [26] considers differentially
private algorithms over time-varying directed networks.
The above works are selective in that these consider privacy-
preserving mechanisms for constraints, objectives or initial
states. An exception is the work Hsu et al. [12] on LPs, which
can handle both private objectives and constraints. We comple-
ment the literature by proposing a mechanism that preserves
private objectives and constraints for optimization problems
with strongly convex objectives and convex constraints.
Contributions
Motivated by personal and commercial privacy concerns
in distributed OPF, we investigate the problem of preserving
differential privacy of local objectives and constraints in
distributed constrained optimization with agent-to-agent com-
munication. Compared to previous works on privacy-aware
distributed optimization [10], [13], we consider the notion
of local differential privacy, which is a refined (and more
stringent) version of differential privacy [7]. It allows each
agent in a network to customize its own privacy level, based on
individual preferences and characteristics. Furthermore, most
previous works consider privacy protection for either individ-
ual objective function [13] or the individual constraint [10],
our more general formulation enables us to provide privacy
guarantees on both local objective function parameters and
local constraint parameters. Specifically, the proposed algo-
rithm solves a general class of convex optimization problems
where each agent has a local objective function and a local
constraint, and agents communicate with neighbors/adjacent
agents with no need for a central authority.
We show that the private optimization algorithm can be for-
mulated as an instance of the Inexact Alternating Minimization
Algorithm (IAMA) for Distributed Optimization [20]. This
algorithm allows provable convergence under computation and
communication errors. This property is exploited to provide
privacy by injecting noise large enough to hide sensitive
information, while small enough to exploit the convergence
properties of the IAMA. We derive the trade-off between the
privacy level and sub-optimality of the algorithm. The trade-
off between sub-optimality and differential privacy allows us
to determine a privacy budget that captures the allowable
cumulative variance of noise injected throughout the network
that achieves a desired level of (sub-)optimality. We propose
two pricing schemes to ensure fair and efficient allocation of
the privacy budget over all participating/biddingDER owners.,
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we consider a distributed optimization
problem on a network of M sub-systems (nodes). The sub-
systems communicate according to a fixed undirected graph
G = (V , E). The vertex set V = {1, 2, · · · ,M} represents
the sub-systems and the edge set E ⊆ V × V specifies pairs
of sub-systems that can communicate. If (i, j) ∈ E , we say
that sub-systems i and j are neighbors, and we denote by
Ni = {j|(i, j) ∈ E} the set of the neighbors of sub-system
i. Note that Ni includes i. The cardinality of Ni is denoted
by |Ni|. We use a vector [v]i to denote the local variable
of subsystem i and [v]i can be of different dimensions for
different i. The collection of these local variables is denoted
as v = [vT1 , · · · , vTM ]T . Furthermore, the concatenation of the
local variable [v]i of sub-system i and the variables of its
neighbors [v]j , j ∈ Ni is denoted by zi. With appropriate
selection matrices Ei and Fji, the variables have the following
relationship: zi = Eiv and [v]i = Fjizj , j ∈ Ni, which
implies the relation between the local variable [v]i and the
global variable v, i.e. [v]i = FjiEjv, j ∈ Ni. We consider the
following distributed optimization problem:
Problem II.1 (Distributed Optimization).
min
z,v
M∑
i=1
fi(zi) (1)
s.t. zi ∈ Ci, zi = Eiv, i = 1, 2, · · · ,M , (2)
where fi is the local cost function for node i which is assumed
to be strongly convex with a convexity modulus ρfi > 0,
and to have a Lipschitz continuous gradient with a Lipschitz
constant L(∇fi) > 0. The constraint Ci is assumed to be a
convex set which represents a convex local constraint on zi,
i.e. the concatenation of the variables of sub-system i and the
variables of its neighbors.
The above problem formulation is fairly general and can
represent a large class of problems in practice. In particular it
includes the following quadratic programming problem, which
we study as a particular instance in our applications.
Problem II.2 (Distributed Quadratic Problem).
min
z,v
M∑
i=1
zTi Hizi + h
T
i zi (3)
s.t. Cizi ≤ ci, zi = Eiv, i = 1, 2, · · · ,M ,
where Hi ≻ 0. In particular, we will assume that the smallest
eigenvalue of Hi satisfies λmin(Hi) := λ
(i)
min > 0.
3A. Local Differential Privacy
We present definitions and properties for differential privacy.
Let P ,P ′ be two databases with private parameters in some
space X containing information relevant in executing an
algorithm. Let adj : X ×X 7→ [0,∞) denote a metric defined
on X that encodes the adjacency or distance of two elements.
A mechanism or algorithm A is a mapping from X to some
set denoting its output space.
Definition II.3 (Differential Privacy). . A randomized algo-
rithm A is ǫ-differential private if for all S ⊆ range(A) and
for all database P ,P ′ satisfying adj(P ,P ′) ≤ 1, it holds that
Pr[A(P) ∈ S] ≤ eǫ · Pr[A(P ′) ∈ S] , (4)
where the probability space is over the mechanism A.
This definition of differential privacy is suitable for cases
where one uniform level of privacy needs to across all elements
in the databases. We now consider a distributed algorithm
A(P1, . . . ,PM ) in a network with M agents for solving an
optimization problem in a collaborative way, where Pi denotes
the private parameters of agent i. The outputs of the mecha-
nism are the message exchanged between nodes in the network
over the time horizon of iterations. This mechanism inducesM
local mechanisms A1(P1, . . . ,PM ), . . . ,AM (P1, . . . ,PM ),
each executed by one agent. The output of one local mecha-
nism Ai is the message sent out by node i, i.e. range(Ai) ⊆
range(A). It is important to realize that although one local
mechanism, say Ai, does not necessarily have direct access to
the input/database Pj , j 6= i of other nodes, the output of Ai
could still be affected by Pj , j 6= i because of the interactions
among different nodes. For this reason, we explicitly write
P1, . . . ,PM as input to all local mechanisms.
We now let each agent i specify its own level of privacy ǫi.
To formalize this specification, we require a definition:
Definition II.4 (Local Differential Privacy). Consider a
(global) mechanism A for a network with M nodes, and M
local mechanisms Ai, i = 1, . . . ,M induced by A. We say
that the mechanism A is ǫi-differentially locally private for
node i, if for any Si ∈ range(Ai) it satisfies that
P {Ai(P1, . . . ,Pi, . . . ,PM ) ∈ Si}
P {Ai(P1, . . . ,P ′i, . . . ,PM ) ∈ Si}
≤ eǫi , (5)
where adj(Pi,P ′i) ≤ 1. Moreover, we say that the mechanism
A is (ǫ1, . . . , ǫM )-differentially private, if A is ǫi-differentially
locally private for all nodes, where i = 1, . . . ,M .
Figure 1 presents the concept of local differential privacy
pictorially, showing the various considerations that can be
taken when designing for local/customized privacy. Firstly,
one may desire to include a central node 0 that communicates
with all subsystems or implement a fully distributed problem
between the subsystems that does not rely on any central
node. The former will lead to better convergence properties
as information spreads more easily throughout the network,
the latter will benefit privacy by making it harder to col-
lect information from across the network. Regardless, the
method allows for the privacy to be purely local, strengthening
the notion developed in [10], which implements differential
privacy in distributed optimization through a trusted central
node, assuming a star-shaped communication structure with
no agent-to-agent communication. Secondly, subsystems may
have varying levels of privacy. In Figure 1, subsystem 1 and
3 have a local privacy specification, while subsystems 0 and
2 do not. The systems with local differential privacy have
outgoing messages perturbed by noise as indicated by the
dashed arrows. As such, the method is flexible to various forms
of distributed optimization or control problems with heteroge-
neous privacy and control properties across its nodes/agents,
extending the work in [13], which considers a similar fully
distributed algorithm but specifies a uniform privacy level for
all agents.
x3
x0
x2x1
Figure 1: A system with 4 subsystems. Arrows denote message
directions in distributed optimization. Here, node 0 denotes a
central node that communicates with all other nodes, which
can be left out (shaded part). The other 3 nodes represent
subsystems. Nodes that have a privacy specification are pat-
terned with dots and send out messaged perturbed by noise,
as indicated by dashed arrows.
III. MAIN RESULTS
A. Differentially Private Distributed Optimization
In this section, we describe a distributed optimization al-
gorithm (Algorithm 1) for solving Problem II.1 with privacy
guarantee, based on the results in [20]. To solve the optimiza-
tion problem in a distributed way, we split the overall problem
into small local problems according to the physical couplings
of the sub-systems. This approach gives the resulting algorithm
the desired feature that each node only needs to communicate
with its neighbors and the computations can be performed in
parallel for every subsystem. To guarantee local differential
privacy, a noise term is added to the message at each time,
before it is sent out to other nodes.
We start with defining the private parameters of agent i
to be the collection of parameters for its local objective
function and constraints in Problem II.1, Pi := (fi,Ci).
Algorithm 1 can be seen as a global mechanismA which takes
input data P1, . . . ,PM and produces output zkj , [vk]j for all
4Algorithm 1 Differentially private distributed algorithm
Require: Initialize µ0i = 0 ∈ Rzi , τ0 = min1≤i≤M{ρfi} and
τk = 1
τ0k
for k = 1, 2, · · · do
1: zki = argminzi∈Ci{fi(zi) + 〈µk−1i ,−zi〉} + δki
2: Send zki to all the neighbors of agent i.
3: [vk]i =
1
|Ni|
∑
j∈Ni
[zkj ]i.
4: Send [vk]i to all the neighbors of agent i.
5: µki = µ
k−1
i + τ
k(Eiv
k − zki )
end for
j = 1, . . . ,M and k = 1, 2, . . .. In particular, the output of A
up to iteration K is given by
AK(P1, . . . ,PM ) := (z1, . . . , zK , [v]1, . . . , [v]K) , (6)
where we use the bold letter zk to denote the collection of
(zk1 , . . . , z
k
M ) at time k and [v]
k to denote the collection of
([v]k1 . . . , [v]
k
M ) at time k. Recall that we are mainly concerned
with local privacy at different nodes, we use Ai to denote
the local mechanism induced by A at node i, which takes
input data P1, . . . ,PM and produces output zki , [vk]i for k =
1, 2 . . ., namely
AKi (P1, . . . ,PM ) := (z1i , . . . , zKi , [v]1i , . . . , [v]Ki ) , (7)
which injects noise δki to the solution z
k
i of its local problem,
according to some distribution.
The definition of the distance d(Pi,P ′i) between to two
problems Pi and P ′i depends on specific applications. For
the quadratic problem in (3), the local objective fi and local
constraint Ci are parametrized by the matrix and vectors
Hi, hi, Ci, ci. One possible definition of the distance for this
special case is given by weighted sum of matrix/vector norms
adj(Pi,P ′i) = a1‖Hi −H ′i‖+ a2‖hi − h′i‖
+ a3‖Ci − C′i‖+ a4‖ci − c′i‖ , (8)
for some weights a1, a2, a3, a4. The choice of the weights will
put more emphasis sensitivity on a specific matrix or vector
and its corresponding parameters. These can be used to define
the “region of adjacency”, which represents the parameter
differences that are considered to be meaningful for protecting
with a differential privacy mechanism. The choice of the norm
can also change the behavior, for instance by treating all
parameters equal (such as for the ℓ1-norm or the Frobenius
norm) or only worrying about the maximum distance (such as
for the ℓ∞-norm). For some applications, only certain entries
of the matrices and vectors represent private information. In
this case, the distance should be defined only with respect to
these “private entries”.
In the classical setup of differential privacy where the
database representation is considered, there is a natural defini-
tion of adjacency: namely two databases are adjacent if they
differ by only one element. When extending the adjacency
definition to the space of functions, there does not exist a
natural candidate for adjacency. Even with a choice such as
(8), it is not completely clear how to normalize the norms. We
should point out that this is a common situation encountered in
similar problem setups such as [10], [13]. However, resolving
this issue would require an explicit connection between the
privacy level ǫ and a concrete specification supplied by the
application (such as in [5, Section B]), which is out of scope
for this paper.
B. Privacy analysis
In this section, we derive the differential privacy level with
Algorithm 1. To state the main result, we first define
g(Pj , µ) := arg min
z∈Cj
{fj(z) + 〈µ,−z〉} , (9)
where Pj encapsulates the local objective function fj and
constraints Cj . The main result is given in the following
theorem.
Theorem III.1 (Local Differential Privacy). Consider Algo-
rithm 1 for solving Problem II.1. Assume that each element
of the noise vector δki in Algorithm 1 is independently chosen
according the Laplace distribution with the density function
p(δki ) =
1
2σk
i
exp(−‖δki ‖/σki ) for i = 1, . . . ,M and k =
1, . . . ,K . Then for all i = 1, . . . ,M , this algorithm is locally
ǫi-differentially private for node i where
ǫi = Θi
K∑
k=1
1
σki
, (10)
and
Θi := max
d(Pi,P′i)≤1,µ
‖g(Pi, µ)− g(P ′i, µ)‖ (11)
is called the sensitivity of the optimization problem.
Proof: The proof is given in the Supplementary Material.
C. Sensitivity Calculation
In order to evaluate the privacy level ǫi provided in Theorem
III.1, we need to calculate the sensitivityΘi. This calculation is
itself an optimization problem which can be written as follows.
max Θi := ‖z∗ − z′∗‖ , (12)
s.t. z∗ = arg min
z∈Ci
fi(z) + 〈µ,−z〉 ,
z′∗ = arg min
z∈C′
i
f ′i(z) + 〈µ,−z〉 ,
adj(Pi(fi,Ci),P ′i(f ′i ,C′i)) ≤ 1 ,
with variables (z∗, z′∗, fi, f
′
i ,Ci,C
′
i, µ) .
This problem belongs to the class of bi-level optimization
problems, for which there is in general no efficient algorithm
to find the global optimal solution. In the rest of this section,
we will specialize our problem to the the class of quadratic
problems in (3) and provide some refined analysis. In this
case, we represent the optimality condition of z∗, z′∗ in
terms of the KKT condition of the optimization problem
5minz∈Ci fi(z)+〈µ,−z〉. Hence, the optimization problem (12)
can be rewritten explicitly
max Θi := ‖z∗ − z′∗‖ , (13)
s.t. z∗ ∈ KKT(Hi, hi, Ci, ci, wi, µ) , (14)
z′∗ ∈ KKT(H ′i, h′i, C′i, c′i, w′i, µ) , (15)
a1‖Hi −H ′i‖+ a2‖hi − h′i‖
+ a3‖Ci − C′i‖+ a4‖ci − c′i‖ ≤ 1 , (16)
with variables (z∗, z
′∗, Hi, H
′
i, hi, h
′
i,
Ci, C
′
i, ci, c
′
i, wi, w
′
i, µ) ,
where the set KKT(Hi, hi, Ci, ci, wi, µ) is defined as
KKT(Hi, hi, Ci, ci, wi, µ) := {z|Hiz + hi − µ+ CTi wi = 0 ,
Cizi ≤ ci ,
wi ≥ 0 ,
wi,j(Ciz − ci)j = 0 for all j} ,
where wi represents Lagrangian multipliers for the optimiza-
tion problem (12). Notice that we used the distance d(Pi,P ′i)
as defined for the quadratic problem in (8).
We state our first observation regarding the sensitivity of
quadratic problems as formulated in Problem II.2.
Lemma III.2 (Sensitivity for Problem II.2). If we specialize
Problem II.1 to the problem in (3) with the distance d(Pi,P ′i)
defined in (8), Θi can be simplified as
Θi := max
adj(Pi,P′i)≤1
‖g(Pi, µ = 0)− g(P ′i, µ = 0)‖ , (17)
that is we lose explicit dependency on lagrange variable µ.
In the rest of this section, we discuss how to estimate the
sensitivity for generic quadratic problems using a sample-
based method. We point out that a more general discussion
of this approach can be found in [2]. For the sake of notation,
we write Θi in (13) as Θi(P) where P denotes the collection
of all variables (z∗, z′∗, Hi, H
′
i, h˜i, h˜
′
i, Ci, C
′
i, ci, c
′
i, wi, w
′
i).
Furthermore we use CΘ to denote the polynomial constraints
given by (14), (15) and (16). With these notations, the opti-
mization problem in (13) can be rewritten as
min γ , (18)
s.t. Θ(P)− γ ≤ 0, ∀P ∈ CΘ .
The idea of sample-based approach is to randomly draw many
instances of P from the set CΘ, and find the maximum Θ(P)
using these samples. Namely, we solve the following problem
γN := min γ , (19)
s.t. Θ(Ps)− γ ≤ 0, ∀Ps, s = 1, . . . , N ,
where P1, . . . ,PN are N randomly drawn samples from CΘ.
More specifically for our problem, we randomly sample the
parameters Hi, H
′
i, h˜i, h˜
′
i, Ci, C
′
i, ci, c
′
i, wi, w
′
i from their sets.
For each sampled set of parameters, we solve the original
optimization problem (3) to obtain z∗ and z′∗, hence obtain
one estimate Θ(Ps) := ‖z∗ − z′∗‖. After N samples, the
maximal Θ(Ps) is set to be γN , which gives a lower bound on
the sensitivity. To quantify the quality of this approximation,
the following definition is introduced.
Definition III.3 (Random Sampling, Definition 1, 2 in [3]).
Let γ∗ denote the optimal solution to problem (18) and γN be
a candidate solution retrieved through solving (19). We say
γN is an α-level robustly feasible solution, if V (γN ) ≤ α,
where V (γN) is defined as
V (γN ) := P{P ∈ CΘ : γN ≤ γ∗} . (20)
where the measure is induced from the uniform sampling of
the constraint set.
In other words, V (γN ) is the portion of P in CΘ that was
not explored after N samples, which, if explored, would yield
a higher function value than γN and thereby a tighter lower
bound on sensitivity Θ(P). The following result relates the
number of samples N to the quality of the approximation.
Lemma III.4 (Sampling Rule, Corollary 1 in [3]). For a given
α ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [0, 1] and let N ≥ 1
αβ
− 1. Then with
probability no smaller than 1 − β, the solution γN given by
(19) is a solution with α-level robust feasibility for Problem
(18).
This result gives the minimum number of samples to find an
approximate optimal solution to (19) with high probability
(larger than 1− β).
D. Analytical Upperbound for Sensitivity in Special Cases
By making additional assumptions on the problem statement
for the Distributed Quadratic Problem, formulated in Prob-
lem 3, we derive an analytical upper bound on the sensitivity
Θi.
Lemma III.5 (Special Case - Protecting Hi in Problem II.2).
Assume fi(zi) :=
1
2z
T
i Hix + h
T
i zi and the distance between
two problems is defined as adj(Pi,P ′i) = ‖Hi−H ′i‖2. That is,
the privacy requirement only concerns about the matrix Hi.
Also assume that the local variable zi is bounded as ‖zki ‖ ≤
Gi, then
Θi ≤ Gi
λ
(i)
min
, (21)
where λ
(i)
min is the lower bound on the eigenvalues defined in
Problem II.2.
Lemma III.6 (Special Case - Protecting hi in Problem II.2).
Assume fi(zi) :=
1
2z
T
i Hix + h
T
i zi and the distance between
two problems is defined as adj(Pi,P ′i) = ‖hi − h′i‖2. That
is, the privacy requirement only concerns about the vector hi.
Then
Θi ≤ 1
λ
(i)
min
,
where λ
(i)
min is the lower bound on the eigenvalues defined in
Problem II.2.
These lemmas give closed-form expressions of the upper
bounds on Θi for two special cases, and they will be useful
for our applications in Section IV. Notice however that the up-
perbounds do not serve as a straighforward design principle for
6scaling eigenvalues to lower sensitivity. As a result of scaling
the eigenvalues, the distance metric d(·, ·) will also change;
higher eigenvalues generally result in smaller sensitivity but
also a narrower and less meaningful “region of adjacency”, as
discussed in Section III-A, Equation (8).
E. Convergence properties of the distributed optimization al-
gorithm
Privacy comes with a price. The noise term in Algorithm 1
makes the convergence rate slower than the case without noise.
However, it is possible to prove that even with random noise,
the algorithm converges in expectation. To show this, we first
write out the dual problem of Problem II.1 as follows.
Problem III.7 (Dual Problem of Problem II.1).
min −D(w) =
M∑
i=1
f⋆i (wi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
φ(w)
+ I{ETw=0}(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ψ(w)
,
with the matrix E := [ET1 , E
T
2 , · · · , ETM ]T and dual variable
w := [wT1 , . . . , w
T
M ]
T . We use f∗i to denote the conjugate
function of fi : Ci → R, defined as f⋆i (w) = supz∈Ci(wT z−
f(z)) and IS denotes the indicator function on a set S
IS(x) =
{
0 if x ∈ S
∞ if x /∈ S .
The dual problem is of the form:
Problem III.8 (Dual Problem Form).
min
w∈W
Φ(w) = φ(w) + ψ(w) .
The stochastic proximal-gradient method (stochastic PGM), as
given in Algorithm 2, is a method to solve the dual problem
above. The proximity operator in Algorithm 2 is defined as
Algorithm 2 Stochastic Proximal-Gradient Method
Require: Require w0 ∈W and step size τk < 1
ρφk
for k = 1, 2, · · · do
1: wk = proxτkψ(w
k−1 − τk(∇φ(wk−1) + ek))
end for
proxτψ(v) := argminx
(
ψ(x) + (1/2τ‖x− v‖2)) .
This algorithm has been studied extensively [21], [22] and
requires the following assumptions.
Assumption III.9 (Assumptions for Problem III.8).
• φ is a strongly convex function with a convexity modulus
ρφ > 0, and has a Lipschitz continuous gradient with a
Lipschitz constant L(∇φ) > 0.
• ψ is a lower semi-continuous convex function, not neces-
sarily smooth.
• The norm of the gradient of the function φ is bounded,
i.e., ‖∇φ(w)‖2 ≤ B2 for all w ∈W.
• The variance of the noise ek is equal to σ2, i.e.,
E[‖ek‖2] ≤ σ2 for all k.
The key observation in our proof of convergence is the
following lemma, showing that executing Algorithm 1 on the
original problem II.1 is equivalent to executing Algorithm 2
on the dual problem III.7.
Lemma III.10 (Equivalence Dual Problem). Consider using
Agorithm 1 on Problem II.1 and using Algorithm 2 on Problem
III.7. Further assume that Algorithm 1 is initialized with the
sequence µ0j , z
0
j , for j = 1, . . . ,M , and Algorithm 2 is initial-
ized with the sequence w0j where w
0
j = µ
0
j for j = 1, . . . ,M .
Then wkj = µ
k
j for all k = 1, 2 . . . and all j = 1, . . . ,M ,
and the error terms in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 have the
relationship ek = δk = [δkT1 , δ
kT
2 , · · · , δkTM ]T .
A proof sketch is provided in the supplementary material,
largely building on results in [19]. Based on the equivalence
shown in Lemma III.10, we are ready to provide the following
theorem showing the convergence properties of Algorithm 1.
Theorem III.11 (Suboptimality). Consider Algorithm 1. As-
sume that the local variables zki are bounded as ‖zki ‖2 ≤ G2i
for all k ≥ 0 and for all i = 1, · · · ,M . We have that for any
k > 1, the expected suboptimality is bounded as
Sk := E[|D(wk)−D(w⋆)|] ≤ 4
∑M
i=1(G
2
i + σ
2
i )
ρ2φk
. (22)
Proof: Consider applying Algorithm 2 on Problem III.8
with Assumption III.9, we can first show that
E[‖wk − w⋆‖] ≤ 4(B
2 + σ2)
ρ2φk
. (23)
The proof of this claim follows the same flow as the proof of
Theorem 1 in [21] by noticing the following two facts: if the
function f is convex, closed and proper, then
‖proxf (x)− proxf (y)‖ ≤ ‖x− y‖ , (24)
and the variance of the gradient of φ is bounded by
E[‖∇φ(wk−1) + ek‖2] ≤ B2 + σ2 for all k > 1.
We then apply this result to our Problem III.7. The gradient
of the first objective is equal to:
∇wφ(wk) = ∇w
M∑
i=1
f⋆i (w
k
i ) = [z
kT
1 , · · · , zk
T
M ]
T
with wk = [wk
T
1 , · · · , wk
T
M ]
T . With our assumption in the
theorem, the dual gradient is bounded as:
‖∇φ(wk)‖2 ≤
M∑
i=1
‖zki ‖2 ≤
M∑
i=1
G2i .
Finally the claim follows because of the equivalence result in
Lemma III.10.
Theorem 22 shows that the suboptimality gap for Algo-
rithm 1 is bounded above by a function that is linear in the
number of agents M and linear in the noise variances σi , i =
1, . . . ,M . The convergence rate is of order O
(
1
k
)
. This is
an improvement compared to the motivating work by Han et.
al [10], which achieved a convergence rate of O
(
1√
k
)
, and
7is similar to the algorithm proposed by Huang et. al [13].
IV. APPLICATION: DISTRIBUTED OPTIMAL POWER FLOW
This section presents a simplified optimal power flow (OPF)
problem that inspires the proposed control approach. We
consider the setting of a radial distribution feeder, and consider
the flow of real power on its branches. We formulate the power
flow model and the OPF objectives and develop the distributed
OPF problem according to the quadratic problem, as defined
in (3). We then discuss the parameters that are subject to
privacy requirements and interpret the trade-offs developed in
Section III.
A. Simplified Optimal Power Flow
Solving the simplified OPF problem requires a model of
the electric grid describing both topology and impedances.
This information is represented as a graph G = (V , E), with
V denoting the set of all buses (nodes) in the network, and
E the set of all branches (edges). For ease of presentation
and without loss of generality, here we introduce part of
the linearized power flow equations over radial networks,
also known as the LinDistFlow equations [1]. In such a
network topology, each bus j has one upstream parent bus
{i | (i, j) ∈ E} and potentially multiple downstream child
buses {k | (j, k) ∈ E}. By Dj we denote the set of all buses
downstream of branch (i, j). We assume losses in the network
to be negligible and model the power flowing on a branch as
the sum of the downstream net load:
Pij ≈
∑
k∈Dj
{pck − pgk + uk} (25)
In this model, capital Pij represents real power flow on a
branch from node i to node j for all branches (i, j) ∈ E ,
lower case pci is the real power consumption at node i, and
pgi is its real power generation. This nodal consumption and
generation is assumed to be uncontrollable. In addition, we
consider controllable nodal injection ui, available at a subset
of nodes i ∈ C ⊂ V that have a Distributed Energy Resource
(DER). In this case study, we aim to prevent overload of
real power flow over certain critical branches in an electric
network. This aim is formulated through constraints∑
k∈Dj
{pck − pgk + uk} − Pij ≤ 0 ,
Pij −
∑
k∈Dj
{pck − pgk + uk} ≤ 0 , ∀(i, j) ∈ Esafe ,
(26)
Esafe ⊂ E denotes a subset of branches for which power flow
limitations are defined, Pij , Pij denoting the upper and lower
power flow bounds on branch (i, j) ∈ Esafe. In addition, each
controlled node i is ultimately limited by the local capacity
on total apparent power capacity,
ui ≤ ui ≤ ui , ∀i ∈ C . (27)
We consider a scenario in which the operator negotiates
different prices for different capacities, potentially at different
points in time, with different third party DER owners. Let
ui refer to the real power used for the optimization scheme
from agent i, and πi denotes the price for procuring a kWatt
from agent i. The optimal power flow determines the control
setpoints that minimizes an economic objective subject to
operational constraints.
min
ui ,i∈C
∑
i∈C
πi(ui)
2 , (28)
s.t. (26) , (27) .
The OPF problem (28) can be recast as an instance of the
quadratic distributed optimization problem (3). First, note that
the objective is quadratic in the optimization variables ui, and
separable per node. Second, for all nodes i ∈ V , the capacity
box constraints (27) are linear and fully local. The safety
constraints (26) require communication to and computation by
a central trusted node. To ensure strong convexity of the local
problems, the economic cost objectives are shared between
each agent i and the central trusted node. Hence, ∀i ∈ C\{0},
the objective reads
fi(ui) =
πi
2
(ui)
2 , (29)
with capacity constraint (27). The central node 0 has objective
function
f0(z0) =
∑
i∈C
πi
2
(ui)
2 , (30)
with safety constraints 26. As such, this distributed problem
assumes a star-shaped communication structure, in which the
a centrally trusted node receives all ui, p
c
i, p
g
i from the agents.
The agents retrieve iterates of ui from the central node and
compute a simple problem with only economic cost and a local
capacity constraint.
B. Private Information in Distributed OPF
We consider assigning privacy requirements to two sets of
parameters; the prices πi that the DSO charges to different
agents in the network, and the capacities ui, ui available to
all agents i ∈ C. Together, these parameters provide important
strategic insight into the commercial position of each agent.
An operator may charge different prices for different levels
of commitment or for the varying value that the operator gets
from the actions of a specific agent at specific time periods
or places in the network. In a natural commercial context, the
operator may have an interest to hide the prices to other agents.
In addition, in a negotiation setting, a strategic agent may want
to find out the capacity available by other agents in the network
to adjust its bid to the operator, so as to be the first or only
agent to be considered, which could lead to asymmetric and
potentially unfair bidding situations. As such, in order to give
all agents with capacity a fair chance to participate, there is
value in hiding the capacity (and price) parameters.
To formulate this as an instance of local differential privacy,
we need to define the adjacency metric for all considered
parameters. In the case of both prices and capacity, this is
achieved by considering the maximum range in which these
parameters are expected to lie. The distance metric proposed
is the ℓ1-norm. Given this metric, we need to define a proper
adjacency relation, which determines the maximum change in
8a single parameter that we aim to hide with the differentially
private algorithm.
Definition IV.1. (Adjacency Relation for Distributed OPF):
For any parameter set P = {fi(πi),Ci(ui, ui)} and P ′ =
{f ′i(λ′i),C′i(u′i, u′i)}, we have adj(P ,P ′) ≤ 1 if and only if
there exists i ∈ [M ] such that
|πi − π′i| ≤ δπ , |ui − u′i| ≤ δu , |ui − u′i| ≤ δu , (31)
and πj = π
′
j , uj = u
′
j , uj = u
′
j for all j 6= i.
By setting δπ, δu and δu respectively as the maximum
price offered per unit of energy (i.e. π¯ if πi ∈ [0, π¯]) and
the maximum capacity in the network (i.e. argmaxi∈C ui), we
ensure that all parameters in the network are properly covered
by the definition.
C. Interpreting Trade-offs
We analyze and interpret the theoretical results that illumi-
nate an inherent trade-off between privacy level and subopti-
mality. Assuming a fixed noise variance across all iterations,
Equations 10 and 22, we have the following trade-off:
ǫi = Θi
K
σi
, SK ≤ 4
∑M
i=1(G
2
i + σ
2
i )
ρ2φK
(32)
Remember that better privacy relates to a lower privacy level ǫi
and a more optimal solution relates to lower suboptimality.
Unsurprisingly, an increasing number of iterations leads to
worse privacy and better suboptimality. Conversely, a higher
noise variance leads better privacy and worse suboptimality.
Figure 2 shows the region of attainable (ǫ,S) values for the
simplified OPF problem. The left figure shows that, for a fixed
reasonable level of privacy (ǫ ≤ 100), the sub-optimality will
decrease for a larger number of iterations K . The right figure
shows that for a fixed level of privacy, the sub-optimality
bound tightens for higher variance levels. For a fixed level of
sub-optimality, a higher noise variance σ achieves a lower (and
hence better) privacy level. Ideally, parameters ({σi}i∈C ,K)
are chosen along the Pareto front of this graph. As a result, a
system designer may want to define specifications,
ǫi ≤ ǫ , S ≤ S . (33)
Based on the specifications, we then want to determine feasible
values for the number of iterations K and noise variance σ1.
For the sake of analysis, we let all upper bounds be the same
in the second equation, Gi = G, ∀i ∈ C. In addition, we
consider the normalized noise-to-signal ratio νi :=
σi
G
, which
is more intuitive as a tunable parameter. With these steps, we
can write
K
νi
≤ ǫGi
Θi
,
1 + ν2i
K
≤ Sρ
2
φ
4MG2
(34)
These equations tell us that the suboptimality is mostly
governed by K , as typically 0 ≤ ν2i ≪ 1 (in other words,
we need σi to be on the order of G or larger to affect
suboptimality). These equations provide a specific test to
determine feasible parameters (ν,K) that satisfy a set of
specifications (ǫ,S,M,G, ρφ). Note that this set may be empty
if the specification are too stringent. Figure 3 shows the
feasible set for varying levels of specifications (ǫ,S).
We now further specify the tradeoff relations for the sim-
plified OPF problem. Note that ρφ = maxi πi := πmax, and
Gi = max(|ui|, |ui|) = ui,max and G = maxiGi = umax. This
yields
K
νi
≤ ui,max
Θi
ǫi ,
1 + ν2i
K
≤ Sπ
2
max
4Mu2max
, (35)
where we have maintained the assumption that Gi = G, ∀i ∈
C for the second inequality. The first equation shows that
the ratio of the number of iterations to the normalized noise
needs to be sufficiently small, capped by the specified privacy
level ǫi and the agent’s maximum capacity. It also shows the
effect of the sensitivity on this trade-off. The latter equation
shows that with increasing number of agents M injecting
noise, we need more iterations to achieve the same level of
suboptimality. Similarly, if the maximum capacity umax of the
agents increases or the maximum price πmax decreases, we
require more iterations or lower noise variance to maintain
the same level of suboptimality.
V. SHARING OR PRICING THE PRIVACY BUDGET?
Theorem III.11 provides a relationship between sub-
optimality and the cumulative variance of the Laplacian noise
inserted by all subsystems. In real scenarios, a system designer
or operator may specify a desired level of (sub-)optimality SK
achieved after K iterations, that is E[D(λK)−D(λ⋆)] ≤ SK .
Rewriting Equation (22), we can compute a bound on the
amount of cumulative Laplacian noise allowed at run-time
M∑
i=1
σ2i ≤
1
4
ρ2φKSK −
M∑
i=1
G2i , Σbudget . (36)
Hence, once SK is specified, a cumulative privacy budget
Σbudget is set. Remember that each individual agent may define
a different distance metric, or different weights, which may
lead to different sensitivities and hence different noise levels
required by the various agents. Since the privacy budget is
limited, a fair and transparent allocation procedure is required
to divide the allowable noise over all agents. Here, we propose
two approaches for going about such allocation.
The first approach, would entail a proportional division
of the pie. This could be done in two ways. The first way
involves splitting the noise variance budget by the number
of agents: σ2i =
1
M
Σbudget , ∀i = 1, . . . ,M . In this case, the
allowed noise variance σ2i determines the maximum level of
local differential privacy ǫi that can be maintained, given a
set sensitivity Θi (or vice versa), as outlined in (10)), which
will differ from agent to agent. The second way involves
setting all local differential privacy levels ǫi equal, and, given
set sensitivities Θi, splitting the noise among all agents.
This is equivalent to equating Equation (10) for all agents
i = 1, . . . ,M , leading to M equations for σ1, . . . , σM :
Θ1
σ1
=
Θ2
σ2
= · · · = ΘM
σM
,
M∑
i=1
σ2i = Σbudget , (37)
9Figure 2: Achievable tradeoffs between privacy level ǫ and suboptimality S, with Pareto front. (left) indicates increasing number
of iterations and (right) increasing noise variance. We assume σi = σ,Gi = G, ∀i ∈ C.
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Figure 3: Feasible parameter sets (ν,K) for varying levels of ǫ (left) and S (right), assuming σi = σ,Gi = G, ∀i ∈ C.
where we assume that the noise variances are constant for all
time steps k = 1, . . . ,K .
The second approach we anticipate is a pricing scheme, in
which the value of privacy is left to a market or negotiation. In
the context of d-OPF, it is natural to assume that different DER
owners with varying privacy levels will have varying degrees
of willingness to pay or incur a deduction on their revenue for
preserving privacy of their local parameters. Here, we propose
two scenarios to perform allocation via the so-called Kelly
mechanism [16]. We assume a one-directional bid wi done by
all agents after seeing a price πσi given by the network operator
to the agent. With the bid, the operator constructs a surrogate
utility function wi log σ
2
i . The operator then determines the
allocation and payment by maximizing the sum of surrogate
utility functions as:
σ2Kelly(w) = arg max
ΣM
i=1
σ2
i
≤Σbudget
M∑
i=1
wi log σ
2
i . (38)
The authors of [25] show that this mechanism works neatly if
one assumes that buyers are price-takers. In the case buyers
are strategic, realizing that the eventual price is influenced
by all bids, i.e. πσi (w), the Kelly mechanism may not yield
an efficient Nash equilibrium. To account for such behavior,
the same authors combined the Kelly mechanism with the
celebrated Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism [24], [4],
[9], proposing the VCG-Kelly mechanism. The VCG mecha-
nism is lauded because it incentivizes all participating buyers
to report truthfully about the value they assign to the goods
sold. It has an intuitive payment scheme, which says that each
player i should pay the difference in utility of the other players
j 6= i between the scenarios that player i does and does not
participate, which leads to each player caring about both its
own utility and that of others, leading to truthful reporting.
The VCG-Kelly mechanism extends the VCG mechanism to
problems with divisible goods [25]. It considers a more general
class of surrogate utility functions Vi(wi, σ
2
i ) = wifi(σ
2
i ),
with fi’s strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice dif-
ferentiable. The allocation rule is then similar in form:
σ2VCGK(w) = arg max∑
M
i=1
σ2
i
≤Σbudget
n∑
i=1
Vi(wi, σ
2
i ) , (39)
and the payment scheme reads:
mi,VCGK(w) =
(
max∑
M
i=1
σ2
i
≤Σbudget,σ2i=0
ΣMj=1,j 6=iVj(wj , σ
2
j )
)
−
M∑
j=1,j 6=i
Vi(wi, σ
2
i,VCGK) .
(40)
The actual form of the utility functions in the context of
our application is left as an open problem, which requires
further investigation. Readers interested in further details and
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examples of the VCG-Kelly mechanism are directed to [25].
We propose these allocation schemes to trigger a discussion
about what a fair and workable division of the allowable noise
variance in our privacy-preserving looks like. This may vary
based on the application. Given that privacy in engineered
systems is a value of increasing importance, it may be wise
to consider the impact of pricing privacy for participants
with varying socioeconomic background. In situations where
certain agents have significantly less resources but privacy is
equally important, a proportional scheme may be the more
ethical approach to take. If pricing is still used and it is
anticipated that some participants outbid others, one may think
about allowing each participant to have a minimum amount of
privacy, which can be translated into an extra linear constraint
in the Kelly mechanisms.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we developed local ǫ-differential privacy for
distributed optimization, building on recent advances the inex-
act alternating minimization algorithm (IAMA). By exploiting
the IAMA’s convergence properties under the existence of
errors in communication and computation, we are able to
add noise to agent-to-agent communication in a way that
preserves privacy in the specifications of user objectives and
constraints while still guaranteeing convergence. The method
extends current approaches for differential privacy in dis-
tributed optimization by allowing privacy for both objectives
and constraints and customization of privacy specifications for
individual agents. We analyzed the trade-offs between privacy
and suboptimality for various levels of noise and number of
iterations, and gave a method to determine feasible values of
noise variance and number of iterations given specifications on
privacy and suboptimality. We propose different alternatives
to allocate the allowable noise variance across participating
agents, either via proportional sharing or market mechanisms
that incentivize for truthful reporting and allow efficient Nash
equilibria, which can be used to implement the algorithm in
fair and efficient ways.
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VII. SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Supplementary material, covering proofs for theorem and
lemmas, and numerical results for an application to distributed
model predictive control.
A. Proof of Theorem III.1
Proof: To show that the proposed mechanism A in
Algorithm 1 has the promised privacy guarantee, we first show
that Ai is locally ǫi-differentially private for node i. To this
end, we study the quantity of interest
P
{AKi (P1, . . . ,Pi, . . . ,PM ) ∈ Z}
P
{AKi (P1, . . . ,P ′i, . . . ,PM ) ∈ Z} (41)
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of node i. In the proof we use random variables Zki , V
k
i , for
k = 1, . . . ,K , to denote the output of the local mechanism
Ai (c.f. Eq. (7)) with input (P1, . . . ,Pi, . . . ,PM ), and use
Z
′k
i , V
′k
i , for k = 1, . . . ,K , to denote the output of the local
mechanism Ai with input (P1, . . . ,P ′i, . . . ,PM ) where the
two local problems Pi and P ′i have distance d(Pi,P ′i) ≤ 1.
With these notations, we can rewrite the above expressions as
P
{
Z1i = z
1
i , V
1
i = v
1
i , . . . , Z
K
i = z
K
i , V
K
i = v
K
i
}
P
{
Z
′1
i = z
1
i , V
′1
i = v
1
i , . . . , Z
′K
i = z
K
i , V
′K
i = v
K
i
}
for some realizations zki , v
k
i , k = 1, . . .K .
It is straightforward to show that if Zki = Z
′k
i , V
k
i = V
′k
i
for all k = 1, . . . ,K , then we have Zkj = Z
′k
j , V
k
j = V
′k
j
for all j 6= i and for all k = 1, . . . ,K . For the simplicity of
notation, we use Zk and V k to denote the tuple (Zk1 , . . . , Z
k
M )
and (V k1 , . . . , V
k
M ), respectively. Furthermore notice that V
k
is a deterministic function of Zk, as shown in the step 3 of
Algorithm 1. Hence we have
P
{
Z1i = z
1
i , V
1
i = v
1
i , . . . , Z
K
i = z
K
i , V
K
i = v
K
i
}
P
{
Z
′1
i = z
1
i , V
′1
i = v
1
i , . . . , Z
′K
i = z
K
i , V
′K
i = v
K
i
}
=
P
{
Z1 = z1, V 1 = v1, . . . , ZK = zK , V K = vK
}
P {Z ′1 = z1, V ′1 = v1, . . . , Z ′K = zK , V ′K = vK}
=
P
{
Z1 = z1, . . . , ZK = zK
}
P {Z ′1 = z1 . . . , Z ′K = zK}
=
K∏
k=1
P
{
Zk = zk|Zt = zt, t < k}
P {Z ′k = zk|Z ′t = zt, t < k}
where zk, vk, k = 1, . . . ,K are realizations of the random
variables. Now we analyze the term
P
{
Zk = zk|Zt = zt, t < k}
P {Z ′k = zk|Z ′t = zt, t < k}
for each k = 1, . . . ,K .
According to Step 1 of Algorithm 1, zki is determined by
µk−1i and δ
k
i , in other words Z
k − mk−1 − (Z0, . . . , Zk−1)
forms a Markov chain where the random vector mk denotes
the Lagrangian (µk1 , . . . , µ
k
M ) in the algorithm. Consequently,
it holds that
P
{
Zk = zk|Zt = zt, t < k}
P {Z ′k = zk|Z ′t = zt, t < k} =
P
{
Zk = zk|mk−1 = µk−1}
P {Z ′k = zk|m′k−1 = µ′k−1}
where mk and m
′k denote the random Lagrangians with
inputs (P1, . . . ,Pi, . . . ,PM ) and (P1, . . . ,P ′i, . . . ,PM ), re-
spectively. Furthermore, it can be checked easily that mk−1
and m
′k−1 are completely determined by Zt, Z
′t for t < k.
Since we have Zt = Z
′t = zt for all t < k, we also have
µk−1 = µ
′k−1.
With the above observation, we can continue our derivation
P
{
Zk = zk|Zt = zt, t < k}
P {Z ′k = zk|Z ′t = zt, t < k} =
P
{
Zk = zk|mk−1 = µk−1}
P {Z ′k = zk|m′k−1 = µ′k−1}
=
P
{
Zk = zk|mk−1 = µk−1}
P {Z ′k = zk|m′k−1 = µk−1}
=
M∏
j=1
P
{
Zkj = z
k
j |mk−1j = µk−1j
}
P
{
Z
′k
j = z
k
j |m
′k−1
j = µ
k−1
j
}
=
M∏
j=1
P
{
g(Pj , µk−1i ) + δkj = zkj
}
P
{
g(P ′j , µk−1i ) + δkj = zkj
}
=
M∏
j=1
exp
(−‖zkj − g(Pj, µk−1j )‖/σkj )
exp
(−‖zkj − g(P ′j, µk−1j )‖/σkj )
≤
M∏
j=1
exp
(‖g(Pj, µk−1j )− g(P ′j, µk−1j ))‖/σkj )
= exp
(‖g(Pi, µk−1i )− g(P ′i, µk−1i ))‖/σki )
≤ exp(Θi/σki )
with Θi defined in (11). Finally, we obtain
P
{AKi (P1, . . . ,Pi, . . . ,PM ) ∈ Z}
P
{AKi (P1, . . . ,P ′i, . . . ,PM ) ∈ Z}
=
K∏
k=1
P
{
Zk = zk|Zt = zt, t < k}
P {Z ′k = zk|Z ′t = zt, t < k}
≤
K∏
k=1
exp(Θi/σ
k
i )
= exp
(
K∑
k=1
Θi/σ
k
i
)
This proves the privacy guarantee in (10).
B. Proofs of Lemmas
Proof of Lemma III.2: We show that for the quadratic
problem, the optimization problem in (13) is in fact indepen-
dent of the value of µ. To see this, we define h˜i := hi−µ and
h˜′i := h
′
i−µ. The optimization problem (13) can be rewritten
as
maximize Θi := ‖z∗ − z′∗‖ (42)
s. t. z∗ ∈ KKT(Hi, h˜i, Ci, ci, wi, 0)
z′∗ ∈ KKT(H ′i, h˜′i, C′i, c′i, w′i, 0)
a1‖Hi −H ′i‖+ a2‖h˜i − h˜′i‖
+ a3‖Ci − C′i‖+ a4‖ci − c′i‖ ≤ 1
with variables z∗, z′∗, Hi, H
′
i, h˜i, h˜
′
i,
Ci, C
′
i, ci, c
′
i, wi, w
′
i
where we used the fact h˜i−h˜′i = hi−h′i. It can be seen that the
above problem formulation is independent of µ, which proves
the claim.
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Proof of Lemma III.5: Using Lemma III.2, we consider
the case with g(Pi, µ = 0) = argminz∈C
1
2z
THz + hT z (we
omit the index i for simplicity). Define
z∗ := argminz∈C
1
2
zTHz + hT z
and
z′∗ := argminz∈C
1
2
zTH ′z + hT z
where H,H ′ satisfies ‖H −H ′‖2 ≤ 1.
The optimality of z∗ and feasibility of z′∗ implies
〈Hz∗ + h, z′∗ − z∗〉 ≥ 0,
and the optimality of z′∗ and the feasibility of z∗ implies that
〈H ′z′∗ + h, z∗ − z′∗〉 ≥ 0.
Manipulations of the above two inequalities yield
〈H ′z′∗ −Hz∗, z∗ − z′∗〉 ≥ 0
which can be rewritten as
〈H ′∆+ (H −H ′)z∗,∆〉 ≤ 0
where ∆ := z∗ − z′∗. This implies that
∆TH ′∆ ≤ ∆T (H ′ −H)z∗
Using the fact that ∆TH ′∆ ≥ λmin(H ′)‖∆‖2 and ∆T (H ′ −
H)z∗ ≤ ‖∆‖‖z∗‖|λmax(H ′ −H)|, we conclude that
‖z∗ − z′∗‖ ≤ |λmax(H
′ −H)|
λmin(H ′)
· ‖z∗‖
≤ 1
λ
(i)
min
Gi
where the last inequality uses the assumption that |λmax(H ′−
H)| = ‖H − H ′‖2 ≤ 1, ‖z∗‖ ≥ Gi, and the minimum
eigenvalue of H ′ is lower bounded by λ
(i)
min
Proof of Lemma III.6: Using Lemma III.2, we consider
the case with g(Pi, λ = 0) = argminz∈C
1
2z
THz + hT z (we
omit the index i for simplicity). Define
z∗ := argminz∈C
1
2
zTHz + hT z
and
z′∗ := argminz∈C
1
2
zTHz + h′T z
where h, h′ satisfies ‖h− h′‖2 ≤ 1.
Since H ≻ 0, we define H = D ·DT with D invertible and
rewrite the above expression as
z∗ = argminz∈C
1
2
zTHz + hT z
= argminz∈C
1
2
‖DT z +D−1h‖2
Let v = DT z. The optimization problem above becomes
v∗ = argminv∈C¯
1
2
‖v +D−1h‖2 ,
where we define C¯ := {DT z | z ∈ C}. Similarly we have
v′∗ = argminv∈C¯
1
2
‖v +D−1h′‖2 .
Hence v∗ (res. v′∗) can be seen as the projection of the point
−D−1h (res. −D0−1h′) onto the set C¯. Since C is convex,
we know that C¯ is also convex, and it holds that
‖v∗ − v′∗‖ ≤ ‖D−1(h− h′)‖ .
Using z = (DT )−1v, we obtain
‖z∗ − z′∗‖2 ≤ ‖D−1‖2 · ‖D−1 · (h− h′)‖2
≤ ‖D−1‖22 · ‖h− h′‖2
≤ 1
λmin(H)
· ‖h− h′‖2
≤ 1
λ
(i)
min
where the last inequality uses the assumption that ‖h−h′‖ ≤ 1
and minimum eigenvalue of H is lower bounded by λ
(i)
min.
Proof Sketch for Lemma III.10: This proof is an extension
of the proof found for [19, Lemma 3.4]. We first write Prob-
lem II.1 in the form of the splitting problem [19, Problem 3.1],
by defining the two objectives as f(z) =
∑M
i=1 fi(zi) subject
to zi ∈ Ci for all i = 1, · · · ,M and g = 0 with the optimiza-
tion variables for the two objectives z = [zT1 , z
T
2 , · · · , zTM ]T
and v, respectively. The coupling matrices are set to A = I ,
B = −E = −[ET1 , ET2 , · · · , ETM ]T and c = 0. Under the
assumption that the first objective f(z) consists of a strongly
convex function on z and convex constraints. The convex
constraints can be considered as indicator functions, which are
convex functions. Due to the fact that the sum of a strongly
convex and a convex function is strongly convex, the objective
f(z) is a strongly convex function. The second objective
g is a convex function. Then, by using the results in [20,
Lemma 3.4], we can prove that Algorithm 1 is equivalent to
Algorithm 2, executed on Problem III.7, the dual problem of
Problem II.1.
VIII. APPLICATION: DISTRIBUTED MODEL PREDICTIVE
CONTROL
In this section, we demonstrate the integration of customized
local differential privacy in distributed model predictive con-
trol. We solve a problem that considers regulating the temper-
ature in a set of rooms in a building, while making sure the
cumulative control signal tracks a reference value set by a grid
operator in a demand response scheme. In this example, we
consider a linearized discrete-time dynamical model for each
sub-system (room):
xi(t+ 1) = Aixi(t) +Biui(t) . (43)
Each sub-system has two states xi(t) ∈ R2 and one input
ui(t) ∈ R1. The first state represents the temperature of room
i and the second state is a virtual state that is the result of
linearization around an intended operating point. The input ui
represents the power input of the heating equipment in room
i. The control goal of this example is keep of the temperature
of each room at a desired level of 23◦C and let the power
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Figure 4: Simulation results
consumption of all rooms to track a signal given by a higher
level planner, denoted by r(t). The dynamical matrices Ai and
Bi are assumed to be controllable. We formulate the following
problem:
Problem VIII.1 (Distributed Model Predictive Control).
min
x,u
N∑
t=0
M∑
i=1
xi(t)
TQixi(t) + ui(t)
TRiui(t)
+ αtr(
M∑
i=1
ui(t)− r(t))2
s.t. xi(t+ 1) = Aixi(t) +Biui(t)
ui(t) ∈ Ui, xi(0) = x¯i, i = 1, 2, · · · ,M .
Here, the weight matrices are set as Qi = diag[10]  0 and
Ri = diag[11] ≻ 0, and the tracking parameter αtr = 10.
The horizon for the MPC problem is set to N = 13. The
state and input sequences along the horizon of agent i are
denoted by xi = [x
T
i (0), x
T
i (1), · · · , xTi (N)]T and ui =
[uTi (0), u
T
i (1), · · · , uTi (N)]T . The input constraint Ui for sub-
system i is set to Ui = {ui|−0.2047 ≤ ui(t) ≤ 0.7409}. This
constraint guarantees that the linearized model is a reasonable
approximation of the original non-linear model. The lineariza-
tion allows us to formulate a distributed QP of the form in
Problem II.1 with local variables z0 = [u
T
1 , u
T
2 , · · · , uTM ]T ,
and zi = ui for i = 1, . . . ,M . The global variable v =
[uT1 , u
T
2 , · · · , uTM ]T . The i-th component of v is equal to
[v]i = [ui]. Matrix Hi is dense and positive definite, since
the dynamical matrices Ai and Bi are controllable and the
matrix Ri is chosen to be positive definite. The local input
constraints are Ci = Ui for i = 1, . . . ,M , and C0 = R
M .
We consider the tracking signal r(t) to be a confidential
signal designed by the utility operator, containing sensitive
market information. Therefore, in the resulted distributed
QP, Problem II.2, the vector hi in the first objective is the
private parameter to protect. By using the sampling rule of
Lemma III.4 and the analytical upper bound (discussed in
supplementary material), we can compute an upper-bound of
the sensitivity of the distributed QP problem as Θi ≤ 0.9756.
We test Algorithm 1 for solving this distributed QP. At each
time-step t, we utilize a warm-starting strategy to solve the
MPC problems by taking the solution of the previous step
to be the initial solution for the current step, and we set the
number of iterations and the noise variance to be K = 10
and σ = 0.1. We compare the performance of the closed-loop
system of the sub-optimal solutions given by Algorithm 1 to
the optimal solutions, over a period of 24 hours (96 steps, 15
mins per step). Fig. 4a shows the tracking performance of the
sum of the inputs ui(t) of all rooms. Fig. 4b illustrates how
the temperature of room 1 varies.
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